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ANTI-NUC ATTITUDES IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA

Dora Alves



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

ANTI-NUCLEAR ATTITUDES IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA

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

Map 1. The World from New Zealand.

ANTI-NUCLEAR ATTITUDES IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA

Dora Alves

1985

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Foreword

The vast South Pacific, so near to Southeast Asia and vital sea lines of communications, is of great strategic value to the United States and the West. Peace in the South Pacific has depended on regional cooperation, primarily under ANZUS—the alliance of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. But New Zealand broke alliance ranks when it refused in early 1985 to allow a US ship to call at its ports following an ANZUS sea exercise. Coupled with the stern US response of suspending military cooperation with New Zealand, the incident threw into doubt the future of the South Pacific accord.

This monograph, by Dr. Dora Alves of the National Defense University, examines the regional events leading to New Zealand's action and the resulting furor. Because the center of the incident is the issue of nuclear arms, Dr. Alves focuses on the growth of anti-nuclear attitudes in New Zealand, where the ruling Labour Party adopted an anti-nuclear stance as *policy*. Dr. Alves' work is both a case study of the interaction of domestic politics with international treaty obligations and a discussion of the strong anti-nuclear attitudes of many South Pacific inhabitants.

Once alliances are broken, the author remarks, they are usually difficult to restore to their original condition. However, each of the ANZUS members has expressed hope of New Zealand's returning to full partnership in the alliance. A healthy regional alliance remains a key to continued security in the South Pacific. Dr. Alves' monograph is valuable background reading for those who would better understand the events, attitudes, and positions that threaten one of our oldest and most successful security treaties.



Richard D. Lawrence
Lieutenant General, US Army
President, National Defense
University

Acknowledgment

I would like to express my gratitude to the many people in each of the ANZUS countries who made the writing of this monograph possible.

DORA ALVES

ANTI-NUCLEAR ATTITUDES IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA

1
The Unravelling of ANZUS

In the early spring of 1985, much of the world's attention was focused on Europe, where disarmament talks were about to begin and Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev became the new leader of the Soviet Union. Thousands of miles away in the Southern Hemisphere, however, another event occurred which attracted less attention but which may also have a major impact. New Zealand's Prime Minister Mr. David Lange and his Labour Government refused access to the USS *Buchanan*, effectively ending trilateral cooperation within the almost thirty-four-year-old alliance of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS). The ANZUS Council meeting, scheduled for July in Canberra, was in consequence cancelled, as well as a number of planned allied exercises and exchanges.

The sticking point between the United States and New Zealand occurred when New Zealand denied a request for the USS *Buchanan* to make a

port visit after the Sea Eagle exercises scheduled for Australian waters in late March. Behind the denial was the real and politically potent issue of nuclear arms. Though the *Buchanan* is conventionally powered, the New Zealand Labour Party caucus still took issue. While it is easy to determine whether a ship is nuclear-capable, it is difficult to determine whether a ship is actually carrying nuclear weapons at a specific time to the satisfaction of peace groups. Since Mr. Lange maintains that New Zealanders do not want nuclear weapons on their soil or in their harbors, his government will provide port access only to vessels conventionally armed. Yet as a matter of principle, the United States, like other nuclear powers, neither confirms nor denies the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard its ships or aircrafts. Neither side compromised, and the resulting confrontation made headlines throughout the West.

Australia had been aware of the potential for confrontation when Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke wrote to Mr. Lange on 10 January that "Australia, as as sovereign nation which must protect its fundamental security interests, has its own well-known and clearly expressed position on visits by US ships."[1] He reminded Mr. Lange that the ANZUS alliance could not have various levels of commitment to suit the political needs of the day. The United States also reminded Mr. Lange that the ANZUS alliance specifically binds parties under Article 2 of the treaty, "to develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack"—something that the New Zealand Labour Party's platform makes difficult. (See the treaty at Appendix A.)

Though the Western world has been surprised by the depth and strength of the anti-nuclear feeling in New Zealand, 65 percent of the population live in self-declared "nuclear-free zones." Many New Zealanders see the banning of nuclear weapons and delivery systems as the key to averting nuclear catastrophe. However, a poll taken in mid-February 1985 showed 78 percent of the population still in favor of ANZUS.

Since his election in 1984, Mr. Lange had said repeatedly that he wished New Zealand to continue as a partner in the alliance, and that his government's posture was not anti-American. As the crack in the solidarity of the South Pacific developed, Mr. Lange insisted that New Zealand was a "loyal ally, a true friend," saying that New Zealanders, of all people, had no desire to see the Soviet Union meddling in their region.[2] After such protestations his government's decision caused surprise. Access to a combatant vessel of the United States was denied after the US government had stated that denial of port access would be a matter of grave concern touching the core of the mutual obligations of allies.

On 6 February 1985, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, publicly commenting on New Zealand's growing recalcitrancy, said, "We have great affection for the people of New Zealand but also remind them that those who value freedom have to be willing and prepared to defend it." Following seven months' discussion with Mr. Lange's government, the United States will now review its cooperation under ANZUS on a case-by-case basis; the door has

not been closed on New Zealand. All measures taken are reversible. The US government wants to keep talking to New Zealand, still considered a friend. The steps taken—such as the reduction in the flow of intelligence and the cancellation of joint exercises—are limited to security and military fields.

Nor does the Reagan administration seek to invoke trade sanctions. However, the executive branch does not control Congress or individual trading companies. New Zealand's withdrawal of cooperation may have an adverse effect on its largely agricultural economy. At a time when US farmers are in a particularly difficult situation, imports—dairy products, lamb and beef, wool, fruit, and vegetables—are likely to be reduced from a country many now see as an unreliable ally.

Whatever steps the United States takes, some New Zealand politicians will claim that they are being "bullied" by a big power. Whatever attitude the United States and Australia take in the future towards their treaty partner, recent events are likely to stiffen the New Zealand posture. Such is its national character. On 25 January 1985 Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer said,

> New Zealand is not a big country, does not carry a big stick . . . our stand is one of principle, going to be resolutely maintained. . . . We will not bend to their [the ANZUS partners'] wishes when our policies are so clearly established and so resolutely held.

To understand the rapid unravelling of a close relationship that had stood the test of time and of an alliance that had been a factor in keeping the South Pacific free of hostile presence, the events since Mr. Lange's overwhelming electoral victory in July 1984 must be reviewed and the growth of anti-nuclear sentiment in New Zealand considered. Because Australia is so important to ANZUS, this review will also weigh that country's close relations with New Zealand, Australian attitudes, and the strength of anti-nuclear feeling there.

II

Mr. Lange As Prime Minister

On 14 July 1984 the New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP) gained a victory over Sir Robert Muldoon's National Party.* Sir Robert had called a snap election, declaring that he no longer had a majority, after a National Member of Parliament, Marilyn Waring, announced her intention to vote against the government on a nuclear question. Although nuclear issues were a campaign topic with peace groups, some elements of the Labour party,

*The NZLP won a 17-seat majority with 91.9 percent of those on the rolls voting—the highest turnout since 1957. New Zealand's "first past-the-post" voting system produced the following results for the four main parties.

Party	Seats	% of vote	% increase/ decrease
Labour	56	42.6	+ 3.6
National	37	35.9	− 2.9
New Zealand	0	12.3	+12.3
Social Credit	2	7.7	− 8.4

and the National Federation of Labour, the average New Zealander's desire for a change, and Sir Robert's at times abrasive manner also influenced the election result. The two smaller parties, Social Credit, which advocated armed neutrality, and the New Zealand party, which urged the virtual abolition of the armed services, took an anti-nuclear stance. In all, 64 percent of the voters chose parties with anti-nuclear policies.

As a practical consequence of the election, at 43 Mr. David Lange is New Zealand's youngest prime minister. A lawyer and a Methodist lay preacher, he is reported to be a pleasant and easy man to work with. Although renowned in New Zealand for his parliamentary skills, he went unrecognized for them elsewhere until he decidedly outclassed the Reverend Jerry Falwell in a debate at the Oxford Union in February 1985. On that occasion Mr. Lange defended the statement that the nuclear policies of the Western powers were immoral. In May 1982 Mr. Lange, then deputy leader of the Labour party, had said that the ANZUS alliance was designed for the conditions of the 1950s and could not be regarded then, or later, as a blank check for nuclear involvement.

Since he became prime minister, Mr. Lange has actively sought an international audience. He has stressed that anti-nuclear feeling in New Zealand is "mainstream"; that New Zealand does not have the strategic value of Australia because it is without minerals or joint facilities with the United States; that neither he nor his government is anti-American. Mr. Lange has linked the anti-nuclear

ship position with the proposal for a Pacific nuclear-free zone and condemnation of French nuclear testing, both popular positions in the South Pacific.

Yet in the opinion of Secretary of State Shultz, speaking immediately after the ANZUS Council meeting of 16–17 July 1984 and after the New Zealand elections, there was nothing to renegotiate; if US ships could not go to New Zealand, ANZUS was virtually meaningless. Mr. Lange at first thought the differences might be resolved, though he maintained firmly that New Zealand would not see the visit of nuclear ships before the next election—or the end of ANZUS.

The following August, a Heylen Poll (Appendix B) showed New Zealand against nuclear weapons in the South Pacific and uneasy about ANZUS; 69 percent wanted the government to renegotiate the treaty. On 28 August, at the South Pacific Forum in Tuvalu, Australia's proposal for a nuclear-free zone—described by Mr. Hawke as the primary objective of his government—was unanimously endorsed. (The treaty has since been signed 6 August 1985 at a Forum meeting at Rarotonga.) The concept is based on the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco which allows passage through air and sea space in accordance with international navigation treaties. Each Pacific nation would decide unilaterally whether to accept nuclear ships for port visits or in its territorial waters. More work is being done on the proposal. The South Pacific Forum also unanimously condemned continuing French nuclear testing at Mururoa and Fangataufa, about 800 miles from

Tahiti. At the Forum, Prime Minister Michael Somare of Papua New Guinea, who had congratulated Mr. Lange on his initiative at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Port Moresby, urged Pacific nations debating nuclear ship policy to consider the area's reliance on the United States for security.

In September 1984 Mr. Lange thought it augured well that the United States' position had some flexibility. Sir Wallace Rowling, who preceded Mr. Lange as leader of the NZLP and is now the Ambassador to the United States, said that ANZUS was no longer relevant in its present form and that replacing it "would mean starting from scratch."

THE NEW ZEALAND LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE

It was against this background that the NZLP Conference took place 9 September 1984. A large majority called for New Zealand to withdraw from ANZUS and urged that the defense budget be cut from 2 to 1.5 percent of the gross national product. The secret debates on defense motions produced the resolution that New Zealand forces be withdrawn from military exercises with nuclear powers; that New Zealand forces be withdrawn from overseas deployment outside the Pacific, except those under United Nations' sponsorship; that the battalion in Singapore be withdrawn within a year; that the US Air Force use of Harewood Air Base (the staging point for scientific expeditions to Antarctica regularly replenished by US military cargo aircraft) should be terminated; that military operations and

intelligence with Indonesia and the Philippines be discontinued; and that the Rapid Deployment Force, proposed by the National government, be disbanded. A call to withdraw New Zealand defense attaches from the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) was defeated.

Defence Minister Frank O'Flynn feared that other countries might misinterpret the conference's resolutions while Mr. Lange cautioned against a "witch hunt" concerning fears of covert CIA action. Shadow Foreign Minister Warren Cooper castigated the "harebrained naiveté of conference delegates," suggesting that the Labour government was hell-bent on taking the country into the insecurity of the non-aligned Third World. The Social Credit leader, Bruce Beetham, commented on the degree of influence wielded by the anti-American extreme left of the Labour party.

Talks between the United States and New Zealand continued through the fall of 1984. The United States administration did not wish to seem to put pressure on Mr. Lange, who had drawn strong criticism from the left wing of his party when he spoke of reaching an accommodation. The US administration made sure that New Zealand scientists were briefed on nuclear matters, and the role of ANZUS in an interlocking system of Western cooperation was clarified. Close cooperation among Australian, New Zealand, and US defense personnel continued as before.

Early in December Mr. Lange, expecting a blanket request followed by specific ship requests from

the US government, asserted that nuclear-powered ships were "not going to come" and that New Zealand was reassessing its stand on nuclear weapons. Mr. Lange thought that the United States, fearing a rebuff, would not request access for nuclear ships. In mid-December Frank O'Flynn spoke of the government as actively considering ways to avoid "total stalemate."

THE CONTRETEMPS

On 17 January 1985, the US government asked for the conventionally powered destroyer USS *Buchanan* to visit New Zealand, and, after some debate, the New Zealand government said that it was unable to reach a decision. (See Appendix C for a clear statement of the New Zealand government position.) The US government then asked for a "definitive response" by 11 February. On 4 February, after a meeting with the full parliamentary caucus of his party, Prime Minister Lange announced a turndown of the *Buchanan*. There were reports that he asked for another ship—one that would not give rise to assertions that the integrity of the New Zealand posture had been compromised. ANZUS began to unravel.

Although Mr. Lange said that his country intended to remain committed to ANZUS, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger characterized the New Zealand stand as a serious attack on the alliance and spoke of the New Zealand government as "following a course that can only be of great harm to themselves." Mr. Hawke told reporters on 10 February that Australia was not interested in a

new treaty with the United States, saying, "The treaty will remain there ready for resumption of full operations between the three of us, if and when the government of New Zealand were to change its position."[3] A commentator in Wellington pointed out that Mr. Lange had little room to maneuver in dealing with a Caucus many of whose members had been elected on one issue—nuclear ships.

Through its response the US government hoped to signal anti-nuclear and other movements seeking to diminish defense cooperation among Western allies that such a course would not be cost-free in terms of security relations with the United States. Predictably, for many New Zealanders the issue had now become a matter of national pride.

After meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William A. Brown in Los Angeles, Mr. Lange said that by cancelling exercises and curtailing intelligence, the United States was deliberately severing long-standing ties with his Labour government and hoping that a new government would reverse his policy.

In Wellington on 5 March 1985 Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer insisted that the basic obligation of Article 4 of the treaty remained and that no one had yet withdrawn from the treaty. In fact, the ANZUS alliance has not been formally abrogated but is in an inactive status. Asked whether it were fair to say that, with ANZUS now under threat, New Zealand might need to review radically its whole foreign policy as well, Mr. Palmer replied,

"No," but asserted that the government would ban nuclear weapons in New Zealand and that no pressure would cause the government to retreat from its stance.[4]

When Sir Wallace Rowling presented his credentials to President Reagan in the first week of March, the President told him, "it is our deepest hope that New Zealand will restore the traditional cooperation that has existed between our two countries." US officials were apparently not interested in the suggestion that New Zealand could increase its activities in the Pacific to compensate for the denial of ship visits. Through the ambassador, New Zealand reminded the United States that there could be a series of counter-productive effects. Sir Wallace added, "If you want to stir up a nationalistic fervor in a country, you couldn't do a better job."

Meanwhile, the United States and Australia reaffirmed their conclusion, reached at the ANZUS 1984 Council meeting, that port and airfield access are essential to the continuing effectiveness of the alliance. The two countries agreed that, unless New Zealand changed its position on port access, the proposed Canberra meeting would not be productive. They also concluded that the banning of US vessels from New Zealand ports was not consistent with strengthening ANZUS or enhancing regional stability. Hearings convened in the US House of Representatives in mid-March reaffirmed the benefits of ANZUS but called for New Zealand to change its policy (Appendix D).

THE LATEST HEYLEN POLL

The Heylen Poll on Nuclear and Defense Issues conducted on 23 March 1985 (Appendix B) was the first one taken after the extent of the US reaction to the nuclear ban was known. Fifty-two percent of the population approved of the ban on nuclear-powered vessels in New Zealand ports. Approval of the ban on nuclear weapons rose from 73 to 77 percent. When asked to choose between breaking defense ties with the United States—the first time this question had been put—or allowing ships that might be nuclear-armed into New Zealand ports, 45 percent were for breaking the defense ties, 45 percent for allowing the ships in, with 10 percent undecided. In addition, 53 percent did not think New Zealand had been treated unfairly by US officials following the ban; 53 percent felt that New Zealand had not neglected its share of responsibilities under ANZUS, while 69 percent believed that if New Zealand were attacked tomorrow the United States would still come to New Zealand's aid. Thirty percent believed that the US defense ties increased the risk of an attack on New Zealand, while 62 percent disagreed with that position.

III

Changing Attitudes

In February of 1985 Americans were surprised to learn the extent of the support for peace movements and anti-nuclear movements in New Zealand. However, more than five years ago a Senior Lecturer at the Victoria University, Wellington, had suggested that attitudes in New Zealand were changing. In dealing with "An Alternative View of ANZUS," Stephen Levine said that ANZUS might be regarded as the kind of defensive and parochial power bloc which the movement toward a more peaceful world had to seek to overcome.[5]

Americans remember New Zealanders as valiant fighters in two world wars and in Korea and Vietnam. They like to think of the laconic Kiwi, of the type who placed a ramshackle sign "NONE" before a small New Zealand unit on a hill in Korea when farther down the hill a very spit-and-polish US Infantry tented camp had proclaimed itself "Second to None." Americans find it difficult to understand New Zealand's present preoccupation with things anti-nuclear. Moreover, when the evidence of worldwide Soviet attempts to penetrate peace

movements is so strong, it is also difficult, from the US point of view, to disregard the possibility that New Zealand's good intentions might be manipulated.

It is a matter of record that the Soviet ambassador to New Zealand was expelled in 1980 for personally passing money to the Socialist Unity Party (SUP), a group which aims to build socialism on revolutionary lines and to undo ANZUS. This party has strong support among seamen and the dockers' unions; SUP members are in leading positions in the Federation of Labour umbrella union confederation. Then, too, unilateralist and pro-Soviet tendencies in the unions have increased since Sir Thomas Skinner's retirement from the Federation of Labour in 1980. His place was taken by Jim Knox who, with the Australian John Halfpenny, holds a prominent position in the Pacific Trade Union Forum. This group was inspired by the World Federation of Trade Unions conference at Prague in 1978 with the idea of influencing nascent Pacific trade unions. Tony Neary, who has fought against communism in New Zealand trade unions for some thirty years, has been quoted as saying that the communist influence in the unions has never been greater.[6] Mr. Lange summoned the Soviet ambassador to New Zealand and told him in the strongest terms that the New Zealand government was gravely offended by attempts by communist states to paint New Zealand's action as supportive of non-democratic interests.

THE TRENDS IN LABOUR THINKING

It is difficult to separate the anti-nuclear current from a more general pacifist sentiment in the NZLP, which takes pride in being the party of "peace, equality, and justice." Looking back as far as 1969, the emphasis in discussion of external affairs within the Labour party (then out of office) was focused on aid and the reduction of poverty within the region. The party considered economic, social, and military cooperation, but rejected the idea that New Zealand should take part in military conflicts overseas. Labour would not accept the Omega long-range navigation system unless it were under the unconditional control of the New Zealand government.

In tracing these trends and the growth of anti-nuclear sentiment, reference is to discussions between members of the NZLP, mostly from national conferences, and not to formally accepted party policy. The salient points are summarized from Labour party conferences since 1969. By 1970 the Labour party itself wanted a more clearly defined defense policy and began to envisage New Zealand as an independent, though cooperative, nation. While rejecting armed neutrality, Labour politicians wanted the opportunity for New Zealand to evaluate each situation critically so that any action taken would reflect the country's own national interests. Some supported the periodic review of troops stationed in Malaysia and Singapore (a useful link, through the Five Power Defense Agreements, with ASEAN).

Gradually through the 1970s, Labour party policies began to emphasize aid for developing countries and to suggest that New Zealand, as a country located outside the main power blocs, should use its influence morally and economically in world affairs. Other ideas emerged as well. New treaties should be non-military pacts of friendship, and New Zealand should disband or withdraw from military alliances. The NZLP would allow the defense forces to serve overseas only as part of a UN peacekeeping force or where clearly obligated under the terms of a treaty. Opposition to the Omega navigation system increased among party members, along with the desire for a "qualified alignment" with ANZUS. One argument focused on reducing the armed forces (to be composed entirely of career personnel), suggesting that such forces should perform more civil defense tasks.

Particularly influential in reshaping New Zealand politically were the actions taken by the Third Labour Government, headed by Norman Kirk from 1972 until his untimely death in 1974. His leadership had a strong and lasting effect on the NZLP. New Zealanders are proud of his steps to protest further French nuclear testing and of New Zealand's endeavors to protect the small island nations. At the UN, New Zealand proposed a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Pacific, condemned the tests, and demanded their cessation. New Zealand eventually took the case to the International Court of Justice. In December 1975 the General Assembly passed Resolution 3477, seeking to establish the Pacific weapons-free zone. New Zealand asked the nuclear powers and the Secretary General to sup-

port these initiatives. The New Zealand frigate sent, with Australian support, into the testing area in 1973 captured the attention of the world and helped to drive the testing underground. To circumvent the nuclear powers extending their military control of the oceans, New Zealand strongly supported the Seabed Arms Control Treaty.

In 1973 the members of the Labour party conference declared their abhorrence of war but did not act upon suggestions to curtail the US Air Force and Navy use of Harewood and to create a New Zealand Peace Force. Efforts were made to organize all the Pacific nations to support the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the region. Still, by 1975, when Mr. Rowling had succeeded Mr. Kirk as Prime Minister and Leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party, though anxious to strengthen the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the party did not support the idea that New Zealand should declare itself neutral. The Manifesto stated, "The defensive alliance formed with Australia and the United States of America through the ANZUS Treaty will be maintained."[7] At the same time, the NZLP was against establishing any more foreign military units in New Zealand and wanted the existing ones removed. Labour party members stressed independence in foreign affairs and, for the first time, pushed through at the annual conference a motion that no foreign warships or aircraft that normally carried, or could be carrying, nuclear weapons would be permitted to visit New Zealand, or use its facilities. A proposed zone of peace in the Indian and Pacific Oceans received strong support, and the party was eager to hasten the Pacific nuclear

weapons-free zone. The NZLP members urged the strengthening of the Antarctic Treaty to prevent the continent's nuclear contamination, and they determined that no ship containing nuclear waste should dock in New Zealand en route to the Antarctic.

The Labour party lost office at the 1975 general elections. By 1976 opposition to all nuclear-powered ships and nuclear power stations had hardened, and members of the NZLP were beginning to consider how the exclusion of nuclear-powered ships would affect membership in ANZUS. The NZLP decided that under a Labour government foreign military establishments would not be allowed in New Zealand except for agreed peaceful research projects. As the seventies wore on, the abolition and destruction of all atomic, biological, and chemical weapons was discussed. The idea of a Portfolio of Peace and the establishment of a Chair of Peace Studies in a New Zealand university were considered. In 1976 the NZLP produced a pamphlet *Labour Wants a Nuclear-Free New Zealand*, from which Figure 1 is taken, which illustrates the tone and content of Labour thinking at that time. The print run of 120,000 was the largest the NZLP had produced up to that time.

As the Labour Party Policy Council debated the adoption of a non-aligned foreign policy and the possibility of withdrawing from alliances with states possessing nuclear weapons, some members proposed that the United States should be informed of the development of NZLP thinking and New Zealand support for a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.[8] A South Pacific regional conference


LABOUR WANTS TO KEEP NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR-FREE
Fact: Labour wants to keep New Zealand nuclear-free.
Fact: A Labour government banned visits by nuclear warships to New Zealand.
Fact: Labour wants to make New Zealand INDEPENDENT – Labour will not kow-tow to any country's nuclear bullying, or give up our independence to shelter under another country's "nuclear umbrella".
Fact: A Labour government, in spite of opposition from the National Party, led the world in putting a stop to nuclear testing in the Pacific.
Fact: Labour, when it becomes government again, will not allow nuclear power stations to be built in New Zealand unless it is PROVED that they are safe, unless it is PROVED that they are absolutely necessary, unless it is PROVED that nuclear waste can be safely disposed of.
Fact: By allowing nuclear warships into New Zealand, National is destroying Labour's achievement of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.
Fact: By allowing nuclear warships into New Zealand, National is making this country part of the insane nuclear arms race that could destroy mankind, is making this country a possible nuclear target, and is putting our children at risk from a nuclear accident.
Fact: Our children deserve a better chance in life than National is willing to give them.

Figure 1. 1976 New Zealand Labour Party Pamphlet

to declare a nuclear-free zone was proposed, to be held under UN auspices. The NZLP hoped to promote a more independent New Zealand with greater contacts with the Third World.

Since his government has come to power, Mr. Lange has said more than once that New Zealand rejects the idea of being defended by an ally using nuclear weapons. Significantly, in 1978 before the UN General Assembly held a special session on disarmament, the New Zealand National government established a National Committee on Disarmament made up of a cross-section of non-governmental organizations. The Committee demanded that the government should declare that it would not countenance another nation using nuclear weapons in defense of New Zealand.

Clearly, Labour's commitment to peace, neutrality, and disarmament was growing in 1978. However, the detailed manifesto also committed Labour to maintain armed forces capable of fulfilling New Zealand's obligations as a treaty partner. Then came an Auckland Standing Committee on Disarmament and endorsement of the New Stockholm Peace Appeal. The Policy Council considered the suggestion that the Antarctic nuclear ban should be extended by 10 degrees annually until the whole southern hemisphere were nuclear-free. Support facilities or services for Trident and Poseidon submarine weapons systems became a topic of discussion. But in 1978 the NZLP lost the election, and in 1979 there were no proposals on international affairs or defense at the party conference.

In 1980 members of the Labour party expressed the feeling that steps taken by Norman Kirk away from dominion status were being obscured; they wanted New Zealand to create its own *independent* relationships with other nations and to control its own destiny. The division of the world into power blocs was thought to create tensions over political, economic, and military barriers, causing conflict and violence. Though accepting that it identified with the Western bloc, the NZLP decided that the next Labour government would not follow a course set by others. Instead, it would stake out its own independent course, based on its own assessments, while striving for friendly relations with all nations. In supporting SALT, the party pressed for discussions on the decrease in arms production, sales, and stockpiles. The party was now focusing on arms control as well as environmental hazards.

Earlier proposals for the support of peace were underscored by the party members. Since defense ties outside the UN were to be shunned, party members considered the point that a non-aligned foreign policy might entail withdrawing from ANZUS. While friendly relations with the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia were thought desirable, party members did not wish these to preclude New Zealand's independent role in world affairs, especially in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. It was suggested that the portfolio of defense should include the promotion of peace and disarmament and that New Zealand should become involved in actively promoting an arms-free world.

By 1982 a desire to declare all New Zealand territory, including the Exclusive Economic Zone,

nuclear-free came to the fore. In addition to the protests over French testing, the NZLP protested Japan's dumping of nuclear waste in the Pacific and urged that all such waste should be stored above ground and inspected. The pacifist trend in some Labour thinking was apparent in the comments of two party members in the *National Business Review* in early 1982. The superpowers, they said, were locked in a deadly struggle and remaining in a military alliance with one of them impeded New Zealand's flexibility to maneuver. To them, devising tactics to disengage from a security arrangement that had outlived its usefulness presented an exciting challenge.

As fears of a nuclear confrontation swelled, the Peace and Justice Forum, Wellington Labour Regional Council, produced a discussion paper on ANZUS, which will be summarized in the next section. Forum members wished to take a lead in educating the public and stimulating opinion on the dangers of nuclear armament. The NZLP decided to support the unilateral withdrawal of New Zealand from all alliances with nuclear powers in an attempt to reverse the arms race. Reliance would be placed on the UN's powers of arbitration and on regional pacts of non-aggression and peace. At the time of the Falklands crisis, the Labour party opposed the National party's policy that, it felt, might lead to possible involvement in war, and it also opposed the idea of offering Britain direct or indirect assistance—although the party did agree to contribute to a UN peacekeeping force.

In 1983 it was stressed that Labour's task was to produce an independent foreign policy that was clearly formulated in Wellington—"not Washing-

ton, nor London, nor Canberra." Independence and the anti-nuclear stance were declared to be nonnegotiable. Positive policy alternatives were sought and the NZLP boldly declared that if the allies were unable to accept its anti-nuclear stance when Labour came to power, the allies would themselves have to withdraw from existing arrangements, since New Zealand's future bargaining position would be weakened should it walk away from the alliance.

The NZLP hoped for an alliance that had aspects other than military, and it emphasized the fact that ANZUS does not require members to accept visits from particular types of ships or aircraft and does not commit New Zealand to defend other areas, such as the Indian Ocean. (This is correct, but the preamble to the treaty refers to a common desire on the part of the signatories "to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific area." Despite the differences among them, it was the sense of a security community that was hitherto important to the three ANZUS signatories.)

Throughout 1983 all of the peace and anti-nuclear positions that had been formulated earlier drew growing support within the NZLP: more emphasis on the threat nuclear technology posed to the environment; stronger opposition to the stockpiling and testing of nuclear weapons; louder rejection of nuclear-armed or -powered ships; a demand that New Zealand should not permit any communication system within its territory that would be used for military benefit of any foreign

power; and a suggestion that any visiting military vessel should be boarded and examined by appropriate people to determine that no nuclear weapons were aboard. One suggestion proposed that New Zealand embassies be required to work in a practical way to support nuclear disarmament. The Labour party's policy sought a posture of neutrality between major power blocs. New Zealand's defense needs were to be centered in regional South Pacific arrangements. The naval and air forces would constitute a coastguard service for the Exclusive Economic Zone and the nuclear-free zone. All foreign establishments for military purposes would be banned by a future Labour government, and purported scientific research facilities would have to be open to the public and subject to inspection by peace movement scientists and research technicians. August 6 would become a National Day of Peace, and observed as a public holiday to draw attention to peace issues and the need to alleviate world poverty.

In 1983, the year preceding the snap election, there was considerable Labour debate over nuclear ships: the Caucus supported the party's policy in April, and in May several regional party conferences also supported the policy. Mr. Lange at first suggested that the concept of a nuclear-free zone was not his highest priority—he was more interested in securing adequate housing, transportation, and education for all the people—but later in the year he made a statement that was closer to the party position. Among those who saw a threat to the ANZUS alliance if US ships were refused access to New Zealand ports, some turned the debate into a trade issue. They contended that by accepting nu-

clear ship visits, New Zealand could assure itself of continued access to US markets. A large group maintained that matters of principle (the anti-nuclear stand) should not be abandoned for trade considerations.

In 1984 the NZLP held a Victory Convention Conference after its first electoral success in eight years. Immediately it was proposed that there should be a Commission of Peace, similar to the Commission for the Environment, headed by a minister and with a staff of ten people. A much greater effort would be made to educate the general public in peace issues, and the government would formulate legislation and mount diplomatic initiatives for a nuclear weapons-free zone in the South Pacific. Protests were to be made to the United States for breaking the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, and for contravening the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Labour reaffirmed the earlier proposals concerning the defense forces and determined to support the efforts of other nations to establish nuclear-free zones.

This review of the evolution of Labour thinking about peace and anti-nuclear positions over the years shows the NZLP consciously rejected the frequently expressed view that ANZUS contributes to feelings of political and psychological security in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

THE WELLINGTON KITSET

In 1983 the members of the Peace and Justice Forum of the Wellington Labour Regional Council

put together a kitset*with the goal of presenting material for discussion and contributing to the debate on the liabilities and benefits of ANZUS. A review of the kitset's salient points indicates the standpoint regarding peace issues of some Labour party members in the capital city. To give a clear idea of the standpoint of one group disseminating its ideas to party members, the following brief review summarizes the text and quotes directly from it, without subjective comment or analysis.

The Introduction states that the contents are recommended to party members as educational material "about the defence of New Zealand and the part New Zealand has played and can play in the campaign for international disarmament."[9] The determination to be leaders in the nuclear discussion traces its roots to the founding of the Labour party as a coalition of Socialist parties, trade unions, and peace groups in 1916. The paper expresses confidence that the present strategy will win public support, as well as voicing the party's vital ethical principles, since the peace movement has never before been so voicing accepted and so broadly based. Its authors see an opportunity to lead the people of New Zealand and the South Pacific to non-alignment and a nuclear-free zone.

In summarizing the historical setting of ANZUS, the kitset maintains that the treaty was "en-

*"Kitset" is a local term for an impromptu discussion paper. It is usually applied to the material, the bits and pieces, used to construct a simple piece of furniture. Although not normally applied to educational or political information, the term is used here by analogy.

tirely political in conception; the Americans wanted to show the world in its [sic] campaign of cold war propaganda, that there was an anti-communist bloc in the Pacific." Implying that ANZUS is not a military commitment for the defense of New Zealand, the kitset suggests that membership in ANZUS justifies a likely scenario for an attack on New Zealand because of links with the United States. According to the section "Myths of Deterrence and the Soviet Threat," though during the Berlin and Cuba crises the USSR seemed an imminent danger to Europe and the United States, hindsight and historical analysis lead to altered views. Whether nuclear deterrence has prevented conflict is irrelevant to the present arms race. After some discussion of the potential effects of nuclear war, the section concludes,

> Anyone who squarely faces the first of these facts [a disaster to mankind and nature as the result of a nuclear strike] must cease to support the use or possession of nuclear weapons, or stand condemned of condoning an appalling potential evil. The conclusion is made easier to bear by the overwhelming probability that real and energetic disarmament by the West would result in the USSR relieving itself of a burden that, economically and morally, it can ill afford to carry.

The authors, in considering New Zealand as a member of a nuclear alliance, are disturbed by US military activities on New Zealand soil. They say that the Naval Communications Unit at Harewood has the capability to act as a high frequency communications back-up for the US Navy in the Pacific should Australia's North-West Cape Station be

disabled by nuclear attack. They also raise a question as to whether US military aircraft of the 61st Military Aircraft Wing could carry nuclear weapons when they use the Harewood Air Base. And since the Black Birch US Naval Observatory Transit Circle Station is involved in mapping celestial movements and positions, the authors, citing the US Navy's request to Congress for funding, note that observatory data would be especially appropriate to accurate targeting of the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the first in the South Pacific with the capacity to hit targets in the Soviet Union. The compilers of the kitset also worry about the possibility that US submarines with a first-strike capability may profit from underwater sound propagation experiments in which New Zealand naval and air forces have taken part.

As to the principle of forward defense and New Zealand's contribution to the stability of the Southeast Asian states, the discussion paper takes the view that there is nothing sacred about stability, saying,

> Though we are under some obligation to prop up anticommunist regimes in the region, it is not clear as to which are any more savoury than the communist states. We do not have the political understanding or military power to deal with the tensions in this region.

The authors also fear that were military assistance given to the Philippines it could be directed by the military regime against guerrilla forces which, if allowed to contest elections, might win majority support from the Filipinos.

The kitset views involvement in wars on foreign soil as immoral. It notes the warnings from Middle East governments that followed New Zealand participation in the Sinai peacekeeping force. In the authors' view, there is economic self-interest in trading with all and in being non-aligned in foreign confrontations, "military alliances make us enemies with countries, which, even if they may not be our friends, can at least be lucrative markets."

Thus, the ANZUS treaty is of doubtful value to New Zealand since "if we were attacked by another country the US would assist us only if it was in their [sic] interests to do so. If it was not, they would not support us, regardless of ANZUS. In either instance the Treaty is irrelevant." This is not the place for an analysis of the reasons which cause the authors of the kitset to consider nuclear confrontation in the South Pacific a serious possibility; however, the kitset reports that nuclear warships are nuclear-armed and environmentally hazardous, quoting a report for the US *Fund for Constitutional Government* released in 1983 on leaked radiation and dumping practices. The authors are convinced that unless nuclear warships and power stations are banned, the NZLP will have no credibility in its endeavors to support the Pacific peoples' wish to end French testing, Japanese dumping, and superpower confrontation in the region.

After describing the consequences of a nuclear attack on New Zealand, the kitset authors claim that by tacitly accepting the protection of US nuclear weapons New Zealand becomes a nuclear target; but by remaining in ANZUS while banning the warships, they argue, New Zealand would remain a

target in a nuclear war since the USSR could not allow even non-military allies of the United States to be the focus of a post-war recovery of the Western bloc. "If we choose sides in a nuclear war, we must accept the consequences" is the kitset's conclusion.

As an alternative, the kitset posits abandoning US super-technology, moving into a non-aligned world, and relying on conventional rather than nuclear weapons, while taking advantage of New Zealand's geographical isolation, the stability of the South Pacific, and the absence of territorial disputes with any country. The kitset states,

> The Soviets have never staged a major amphibious landing in its history [sic] and would be hard-pressed to do so now. Its [sic] naval armament is weighted heavily in favour of antiship and anti-aircraft missiles, with few ships carrying the gun or assault rocket artillery necessary for an opposed marine landing.

The kitset advocates an integrated defense policy "built on non-alignment between major power blocks which, with our geographic position, would make us very unlikely to be involved in global conflict." In advocating a civilian-based defense for New Zealand, the paper's authors admit to one problem: getting rid of the war system. To find a regional alternative to ANZUS, they suggest a role similar to Singapore's. The authors consider that just because New Zealand spurns a superpower alliance it is not defenseless: "Our best defence is a foreign policy which will not participate in unbounded militarism ... prosperity and social justice in our region is the surest foundation for peace."

These were only some of the opinions of a regional branch of the NZLP in 1983. An official account of "eight months of Labour progress vs. eight years of National neglect," lists the NZLP's achievements from Agriculture to Youth.[10] The report notes, among other achievements in foreign affairs, Mr. Lange's attendance and address at the UN General Assembly in September 1984, and his address emphasizing commitment to the test ban treaty to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. "New Zealand's stance in international affairs," according to the report, "is ... earning respect as being an independent and principled policy reflecting New Zealand's interests." Barely two months before, the UN Secretary General, Mr. Javier Perez de Cueller, congratulated Mr. Lange, saying the Labour policy was very much along the lines of the UN philosophy.

Mr. Lange's soaring popularity at home may puzzle Americans who tend to regard him as a political naif, though he is seen differently from a New Zealand perspective. He leads the moderate faction of the Labour party, he has captured the world spotlight as the articulate and gallant underdog, and he has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. The loss of popularity by Mr. J. K. McLay, who displaced Sir Robert Muldoon as leader of the National party, has weakened the Opposition. Recent polls trace a steady fall in popularity for Mr. McLay, who had challenged Mr. Lange's statement that the FFG 7-class frigates might be regarded as not being nuclear, noting the inconsistency and "utter hypocrisy" of the Labour party.[11] Mr. McLay had also said that the trust that formerly characterized the ANZUS agreement could not be

reestablished overnight, and that even if the Reagan administration were convinced that it was dealing with a more temperate New Zealand, there would still be Congress to convince.

New Zealand has an area of 104,600 square miles (27.1 million hectares) and a population of about 3.2 million. In that setting, as Sir Wallace Rowling has emphasized, the anti-nuclear statements of professional groups have been important in molding public opinion. Their statements have probably had more impact than the fraternal visits of the Greens from the Federal Republic of Germany or peace activists from Australia.

A STATEMENT OF CONCERN

An example of the contributions made by professional groups is one statement of the New Zealand Ecological Society. This scientific society, drawing its membership largely from research and teaching institutions, was founded in 1951 "to promote the study of ecology and the application of ecological knowledge in all its aspects." The society's three earlier papers had considered beech forests, population policy, and nuclear power. The present study, called *the Environmental Consequences to New Zealand of Nuclear Warfare in the Northern Hemisphere*, is a statement of concern summarizing published information available up to July 1984.[12]

The society considers that the generation of dust and smoke, lowered temperatures, depletion of the ozone layer, increased ultra-violet radiation,

and severe climatic changes would have more serious effects than radioactive fallout. The statement also tries to identify issues requiring action in New Zealand.

The council of the society suggests that New Zealanders should help in local, regional, and global forums to reduce and eliminate eventually the threat of nuclear war "not just for the human species but for all life on the planet." Scientists are especially responsible for clarifying to the general public the consequences that would follow a nuclear explosion. The council holds that a nuclear war, even the nuclear arms race, may be prevented by assembling information to show how extensive and enduring will be the chaos in the world's natural systems after a nuclear explosion. The council recommends wider public exposure in the media and in the educational system to nuclear issues, and it endorses the 1955 statement of concern issued in the names of Lord Bertrand Russell and Dr. Albert Einstein.

It is important to remember that not only the far left radical elements in New Zealand society support the peace and anti-nuclear movements, but a broad spectrum of the population, often persuaded by literature from the scientific or near-scientific community. Peace Movement Aotearoa (the Maori name for New Zealand) is the coordinating body for 300 peace groups, and while the veteran's association could not be described as a peace movement, the chairman's reply to a message from the Australian Returned Services' League helps to show the tenor of New Zealand thinking. It was reported in the press on 31 January

1985 that the President of the Australian organization, Sir William Keys, wrote to his New Zealand counterpart saying that if one partner to ANZUS wanted its benefits, without the risks, there would be doubts about the future of the alliance. From New Zealand Sir William Leuchars responded expressing full support for the nuclear warship ban, saying New Zealand had an elected government which would make its own decisions in the interests of the country, and face up to the political consequences.

Government spokesmen in New Zealand have contended that the credibility of ANZUS should not hinge on an occasional ship visit. (The occasional ship visit to Auckland stirs up a lot of emotion. Because the harbor is in the middle of the city, a visiting ship is highly visible.) New Zealanders, in general, feel that their record and reliability as allies should carry more weight within the alliance. From the US point of view, the stress by anti-nuclear New Zealanders on the question of ship visits calls into question the whole defense posture, since the Labour government is unable to accept that the security alliance may well be instrumental in keeping the South Pacific from becoming a theater for nuclear confrontation. Certainly the democratically elected New Zealand government has the right to formulate its own policy. But, at the same time Americans have difficulty forgetting that Mr. Lange has said things such as, "The issue is whether, in its relationships with other countries, the United States might find those other countries saying, 'Look, New Zealand has stood up, now we don't want you either.' That's the real issue."[13] Though he delivered those words in the euphoria of vic-

tory, later in the year Mr. Lange admitted that New Zealand had been unable to convert even its nearest neighbor, Australia, to this line of thinking.

THE INTERIM DEFENCE REVIEW*

The New Zealand Ministry of Defence recently completed an urgent review of defense requirements in the light of the government's non-nuclear policy, a review intended to form a basis for decisionmaking over the coming years. One product of it is the announced increase of $75 million in defense spending, though it is not at present clear how long a period that sum will be spread over. Regarding ANZUS, the report states that the disagreements with the United States have not altered Labour's fundamental interests. In the third paragraph, on "ANZUS and Security," the report reiterates a view we have seen before:

> The government's policy on nuclear ship visits has not changed the security risk to New Zealand. In strategic terms, any threat that did develop would also affect Australia and almost certainly the United States as well. The fundamental guarantees afforded by ANZUS remain valid. This is recognized by Australia and the United States.

After outlining New Zealand's immediate and practical requirement to ensure by its own actions and through cooperation with its neighbors,

*Citations are from the unclassified version of the interim review.

including Australia, that the South Pacific does not become an area of instability and conflict, the report calls for "a new fabric of cooperation . . . to be developed with both our South Pacific neighbours and our ANZUS partners, based on a clear definition of New Zealand's interests and policy of self-reliance." This theme is stressed again in paragraph 11, which follows the statement that Australia is New Zealand's closest ally and that good relations with Australia are fundamental to New Zealand's foreign policy and are increasingly important domestically. The emphasis on Australian-New Zealand ties continues with a call for a joint role in the South Pacific.

IV

Australian Attitudes

Australia's position has been made difficult by the events of February 1985. New Zealand is Australia's close neighbor and long-standing ally. There is frequent cross-Tasman travel, and the two antipodean countries look on each other as "mates." Although Australians respect the New Zealand desire to further nuclear disarmament, most seem to feel that New Zealand is not really attuned to the *real* world and that it has acted foolishly in breaking up a perfectly good alliance for a matter of principle when there are no apparent gains for peace in the stand taken. The safety record of US nuclear-powered or -capable warships is, after all, as easily verifiable as the Soviet build-up at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang.

The Australian Labor Party (ALP) government, continuing the policy declared in opposition, wishes the US ships, whether nuclear-powered or nuclear-capable, to use Australian port facilities in transit. It opposes home porting of foreign warships in Australia, and the launching operations involving nuclear weapons from Australian territory.[14]



Source: Dora Alves, *The ANZUS Partners* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1984), p. 2. Copyright © by The Center for Strategic and International Studies. Used by permission.

Map 2. Australia, New Zealand, and Southeast Asia

The USS *Buchanan*, the ostensible cause of the furor, not only called at Rabaul, Papua New Guinea, on the way to take part in the Flying Fish exercise, but also docked in Sydney on 4 March despite the protests of local unions and the peace groups. As part of its alliance responsibilities under ANZUS, Australia accepts port visits and hosts joint facilities; thus Prime Minister Hawke's careful answering of questions in the Australian House of Representatives in February 1985 affords insights to Australian political thinking. The Opposition had raised questions concerning the efforts of Premier Cain in Victoria and Premier Wran in New South Wales to restrict ship visits in Melbourne and Sydney. Mr. Hawke stated,

> The Government regards access to Australian ports for United States vessels as being essential to the effective functioning of ANZUS.... Nuclear ships are permitted to visit those ports where the necessary contingency safety regulations could be met in the unlikely event of a reactor accident.

He went on to point out that there is no operational requirement for every type of US ship to visit every Australian port.[15] Mr. Hayden, acknowledging that Australia could not escape the consequences of a massive nuclear exchange between superpowers, said that Australia had a liability to engage in procedures which could discourage and deter nuclear exchanges from taking place, and such was the role of US-Australian joint facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar.

DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT

During the debates which followed his return to Australia after changing his mind about supporting the MX tests, Mr. Hawke made it very clear in parliament that he regretted the differences that had arisen between the United States and New Zealand and underscored that he thought it very important that no one in parliament should say or do anything which might lead to a worsening of those relations.[16]

As regards the joint facilities, the Australian Labor government is proud that it took the Australian people into its confidence by explaining the role that the facilities play in deterrence as Mr. Hawke did on 6 June 1984. The Hawke government feels that the facilities contribute to the deterrence of nuclear war by enabling the timely knowledge of developments that have military significance, for example, the provision of early warning information from space satellites about missile launchers. They also contribute to monitoring as part of verification of compliance with the previous arms control agreements.

When ANZUS was debated the same day in the Australian Senate, Senator Gareth Evans, speaking for the Labor party and for the Labor party in government, stated that the party's support for ANZUS was complete and unequivocal. He quoted two statements made by Cabinet on 12 February, "Federal Cabinet today reaffirmed Australian Government policy on the basic issues of the Australia/US Alliance, ANZUS Treaty and on disarmament and

deterrence," and, "There was also general agreement that both the Australia/US Alliance and the need to do all in our power to ensure the maximum possible progress on disarmament were essential to Australian foreign policy." He condemned the attitude of the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Peacock, saying that his had been the kind of behavior over the last few weeks calculated to tear apart not only Australia and New Zealand bilateral relationships, but the whole delicate interrelationship among the three treaty partners. Senator Evans pointed out that it had for a long time been well understood by the Australian people that ANZUS was fundamental to their security.[17]

THE MX TESTS

The United States wished to launch an unarmed missile from California to descend in the Pacific in order to test accuracy and performance factors for 6,000 miles. The Fraser government had agreed to give support for mobile telemetry ships operating in international waters. US surveillance planes would have operated from a Sydney base to monitor the last stages of the flight. In 1983 the Labor Prime Minister and Defence Minister agreed to the test so long as it was outside the Australian 200-mile zone. The party and the public were not told. The "crisis" was provoked by a series of carefully timed media leaks during Mr. Hawke's visit overseas.

In the House of Representatives the coalition in opposition was seeking to make political capital

from Mr. Hawke's "backdown on the MX missile crisis." The Australian press took the matter far more seriously than the Reagan administration had. Officials in Washington agreed that the refueling of a few planes and support of a ship were not vital matters. History will determine whether Mr. Hawke made the right decision when he retreated, whether it was better to give a little at that time in order to preserve a great deal more, or whether his *volte face* simply served to encourage the left and would prove, as Mr. Peacock, the Leader of the Opposition, claimed, a springboard for the left's next step.

Today Mr. Hawke has a problem with factions within his party that will call for his considerable powers of conciliation. Some members of the Labor party and some Australians would welcome a break with the United States. The left wing of the party characterized the prime minister's statement as "extraordinary" when Mr. Hawke said in an interview early in March that he would not want to be Prime Minister if central elements of the alliance, such as port access for nuclear ships and Australian hosting of joint facilities with the United States, were repudiated.[18]

Mr. Hawke has said that the alliance relationship with the United States is central and that the Labor party will do everything to maintain it. The prime minister also wants the capacity of Australian and New Zealand defense to remain undiminished in the South Pacific, which is less stable than it was. Mr. Hawke has said that it would be "an act of mutual insanity" if the United States, New Zealand,

and Australia did something to reduce the capacity of ANZUS in that area.

Appointed by the new defence minister, Mr. Kim Beazley, to make a 12-month study of defense issues, Mr. Paul Dibb observed, "The prospect of a breakup of the ANZUS treaty would be of enormous benefit to the USSR's worldwide interests. . . . Nothing would be more welcome than the dissolution of ANZUS involving as it does such close allies of the United States." Yet Australia, because of its size, geography, and many other factors, is less easy to influence than New Zealand. Anti-nuclear sentiment is not concentrated on one issue. There is overlapping between groups whose prime interest is conservation, anti-uranium mining, Aboriginal rights, peace issues, women's issues, youth, and opposition to the joint facilities. There are ties between peace groups in Australia and New Zealand, and, reportedly, the left wings of the two Labor parties provide mutual support.

However, without a doubt the ALP's platform on nuclear disarmament is a strong one (Appendix E). Anti-nuclear feeling dates back quite a long way. Among the new policies introduced by the Whitlam government (1972–1975) was the decision that Australia would neither develop nor acquire nuclear weapons. A World Disarmament Conference was discussed during Whitlam's visit to Moscow in January 1975, the first such visit by an Australian Prime Minister. However, Whitlam was luke-warm when New Zealand's Norman Kirk sought his support for a Pacific nuclear-free zone because he thought it would contradict the alliance defense posture. A pacifist-youth connection developed

during the Whitlam years and anti-American sentiment increased. The ALP had been prompt to oppose the Vietnam war; when the war situation deteriorated, the party picked up credibility and votes. Although Mr. Hawke has said that there is no evidence to support the allegation, suggestions that the CIA had a hand in the fall of the Whitlam government persist.

ANTI-NUCLEAR ADHERENTS AND POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Today, teachers' unions and young people are strong supporters of the anti-nuclear movement, and there are plans for anti-nuclear education in the schools. (A survey conducted by the Australian Democrats before the last election found most support for nuclear issues coming from the 18–35 age group and from women.) The first Hawke election was helped by the reduction in the voting age, but the creation, on 17 June 1984, of the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP), with Peter Garrett, a singer with the Midnight Oil group, heading the New South Wales branch, drew voters from the ALP far more than from the opposition parties. The ALP can ill afford to have single issue groups, such as NDP, "hiving off." The NDP polled 6.8 percent of the total national Senate vote, and the charismatic Mr. Garrett narrowly failed to win a New South Wales Senate seat. Jo Valentine of West Australia won the party's only Senate seat. Now, six months later, the party is split and its credibility undermined with allegations of Trotskyist infiltration.

A number of communists and former communists are prominent in the NDP, and NDP election

handouts were produced by the printer of the communist *Tribune*. The party platform calls for the closing of all US bases in Australia; prohibition of the stationing of nuclear weapons in Australia or their passage through sea and air space; and the termination of all mining and export of uranium, even to the repudiation of all commitments of former governments. The platform calls to mind Paul Dibb's comment,

> Unlike NATO, ANZUS does not directly threaten the national security of the Soviet homeland with military attack. But the roles of North-West Cape, Pine Gap, and Nurrungar suggest that it is in the Soviet Union's interests to see them removed from Australia through political pressure. Moreover, Moscow would like to see the United States prevented from using port and air facilities in the region for its naval warships and military aircraft.[19]

In most states the Communist Party of Australia decided to advocate first preference for the NDP in the Senate. (Australia has a system of voting in which it is compulsory to mark the ballot paper so as to indicate the order of preference of all candidates. When a candidate receives an absolute majority at the first count, he is elected and the second preferences are ignored. If no one gains an absolute majority at the first count, the second preferences of those who voted for the candidate with the lowest first preference vote are distributed. The procedure is repeated until one candidate emerges with an absolute majority.)

Jean Melzer, a former secretary of the Victorian Labor Party, former Labor senator, former member of the Communist party, having connections with several anti-nuclear groups, is prominent in the NDP. From their published statements, it would seem that Jean Melzer and her associates wish to use the NDP as a broad movement supporting far-left and Marxist causes. Melzer has asked the government to call for the closing of the Cam Ranh Bay, Subic, and Clark bases and has asked the government to state whether it would guarantee that the United States would not use nuclear arms in Australia's defense. The "Greek Progressive Youth of Australia" festival (Figure 2), at which Melzer was a guest speaker, is an example of a rally appealing to young Australians.

The Campaign for International Cooperation and Disarmament (CICD) has a rather similar philosophy to the NDP. The pro-Moscow Socialist Party of Australia has urged its members to occupy leading positions in the peace movement, to encourage party committees to produce and distribute peace leaflets, to collect signatures for peace petitions, and to establish peace committees in the factories. The development of anti-imperialist tendencies among workers and unionists taking part in peace demonstrations has been advocated.

While the numbers and strength of the communists who are active in the peace movement should not be exaggerated, their organizational skills and the impact of their emotive, easily grasped slogans should not be underestimated. Their organizers frequently achieve the appeal of the anti-Vietnam war campaign in the United States

8th FESTIVAL G.P.Y.A. 1985

Youth for Peace
Progress and Participation

IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GREEK PROGRESSIVE YOUTH OF AUSTRALIA (G.P.Y.A.) 8TH FESTIVAL, A WEEK-END CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD TO LOOK AT ISSUES OF PEACE, MULTI-CULTURALISM, UNEMPLOYMENT AND PROJECTIONS OF GREEK-AUSTRALIAN YOUTH.

DURING THE PEACE SEMINAR, SPECIAL EMPHASIS WILL BE GIVEN TO RECENT ALLEGATIONS THAT PINE GAP IS BEING USED TO SPY ON AND INTERCEPT COMMUNICATION IN GREECE. AN ACCOUNT WILL BE GIVEN ON THE GREEK COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO THESE ALLEGATIONS AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S EXPLANATION ON THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE GREEK COMMUNITY.

GUEST SPEAKERS WILL BE JOAN COXSEDGE, M.L.A. VICTORIA FOR THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY AND JEAN MELZER, FOR THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PARTY.

THE SESSION ON PEACE WILL BE HELD AT 11.00 AM AT PRINCES HILL HIGH SCHOOL, ARNOLD ST., CARLTON NORTH. ON SATURDAY, THE 27TH DAY OF APRIL.

THE GREEK PROGRESSIVE YOUTH OF AUSTRALIA

Figure 2. "Greek Progressive Youth of Australia" Poster

in the late sixties. Last August, to give an example, a Country Peace Groups Conference (Figure 3) had two days of group reports, seminars, workshops, theater, and music with the aim of putting rural peace groups in touch with each other and stimulating peace marches in small towns that had not seen a march since the boys returned from the Vietnam war. The peace groups have a well-orchestrated media campaign. Peter Garrett got a great deal of pre-election free publicity. Such groups also display the disturbing, but effective, tendency to exaggerate numbers. The headcount of "protesters" in Freemantle in 1984 included not only apolitical shoppers but also members of a US carrier's crew, who had paused to listen to the peace movement's rock band.

Professional assessments of nuclear questions have an impact in Australia as they do in New Zealand. One example from the Australian professional literature is the product of the Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Nuclear Weapons and Other Consequences of Australian Uranium Mining, which was produced in time for the July 1984 Federal ALP Conference.[20] Major donations towards production of the report were made by the Nuclear Free Zone Secretariat and the Australian Conservation Foundation.

While some groups wage a compaign of fear and others disseminate anti-American propaganda, there is no comparable campaign to correct flagrant misstatements of fact or to defend the alliance. There are no discussion papers to provide a focus for pro-United States sentiment (though there is a



Figure 3. "Disarmament Rally" Notice



ROCK THE BOAT

RALLY FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ON MARCH 31

On Palm Sunday (April 15) 1984, over 250,000 Australians took to the streets to call for disarmament and an end to Australia's involvement in preparations for nuclear war. More recently, just over one million Australian voters declared their support for a nuclear-free Australia.

Across the Tasman, the people and the government of New Zealand joined with other South Pacific nations to show the world that it is indeed possible to defy the nuclear powers. By banning the visits of nuclear warships, New Zealanders have made a stand for nuclear disarmament. It's time to make ours.

1984 saw the growth and strengthening of the Australian disarmament movement. Australia however, through the ANZUS alliance with the United States, remains vitally involved in preparations for nuclear war.

THE AUSTRALIAN CONNECTION

MX Missile Tests

The MX missile is the most potent missile yet developed and is designed for use in a first-strike. By consenting to the testing of the missile in the Pacific, Australia has approved a major escalation of the arms race.

Nuclear Weapons in our Ports

Nuclear-armed warships, submarines and B52 bombers regularly visit Australia. The warships and submarines of the US Pacific fleet are now being fitted with the TOMAHAWK nuclear cruise missile — a highly accurate, deadly and provocative nuclear weapon. The presence of the Tomahawk in Port Phillip Bay would make Melbourne a prime nuclear target.

Nuclear Bases

The numerous US facilities on our soil do not contribute to our defence or to nuclear 'deterrence', but to US plans for a 'winnable' nuclear war. North West Cape, Nurrungar and the recently upgraded Pine Gap facility near Alice Springs, are high priority nuclear targets for the Soviet Union. The Watsonia base in suburban Melbourne contributes to the targeting of Soviet nuclear submarines.

Uranium

Without uranium there could be no nuclear war. The uranium mined and exported by Australia for use in nuclear reactors can also be used in the production of nuclear weapons. Roxby Downs in South Australia is potentially the world's largest uranium mine.

VOTE WITH YOUR FEET

On SUNDAY MARCH 31, demand a future free from fear, free from nuclear weapons. By refusing the MX, banning nuclear ship visits, closing down nuclear bases and stopping the mining and export of uranium, Australians would be making a genuine contribution to disarmament in our region. We would be making our stand for world peace. The solution is in our hands.

RALLY TREASURY GARDENS 1.00 P.M.

Or attend launching of 'peace flotilla' — sailing from Station Pier 11.30 a.m. (powered craft) and Morell Bridge 1.30 p.m. (unpowered craft). Youth PND radial march to city from Station Pier 12.30 p.m.

JOIN UP — People for Nuclear Disarmament is neither pro-Soviet nor pro-USA. We are pro-disarmament and we need your support.

To: PEOPLE FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
PO Box 132, Carlton South 3053
Phone: 663 3646

I would like:

Further information to help with the march ;

To sponsor PND ($10 individuals; $5 concession) ; To donate to the expenses of PND! ; (I enclose $.....)

Name.....

Address.....Phone .....

Figure 3. "Disarmament Rally" Notice (continued)

group called Friends of ANZUS) or to provide balance for the targeted sections of the population.

As Professor Henry S. Albinski has pointed out, at the Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs 18 March 1984 (Appendix D), Australian public support for the ANZUS alliance is more extensive and solid than that of New Zealand. It would be electorally self-defeating for a major Australian political party to follow the New Zealand Labour Party's lead.[21]

V

The Changed Alliance

The growth of anti-nuclear sentiment in New Zealand, not confined to the NZLP alone, has altered the status of the alliance. New Zealanders were genuinely surprised that the United States reacted so strongly to the rejection of the USS *Buchanan*. The anti-nuclear movement had long been urging the rejection of nuclear ships. Though Mr. Lange had known since July 1984 that he would have to choose between refusing warship entry and the alliance, he did not make the ramifications of the choice clear to the public in New Zealand. Perhaps only now are New Zealanders realizing that the United States, involved in global, rather than regional strategy, is urging a positive position—solidarity.

The US position is that the ANZUS partners stand together in a positive defensive alliance as Soviet military strength in the Pacific grows and as danger spots in the Philippines, the South China Sea, and New Caledonia develop (Map 3). The goal of the ANZUS signatories has always been to deter



Source: John Carter, ed., *Pacific Islands Yearbook*, 14th edition (Sydney: Pacific Publications, 1981).
Copyright © Pacific Publications 1981. Used by permission.

Map 3. The Pacific Region

small conflicts that may escalate to the alarming collisions all nations wish to avoid.

In February 1985 fears surfaced in Washington that other allies with strong anti-nuclear movements might follow New Zealand's lead. That has not happened. Among the European Economic Community countries, New Zealand is only important to the United Kingdom. Nations that have experienced centuries of diplomacy and balance of power assessment recognize the realities of the global alliance system, and they believe that a treaty is a treaty. With the Soviets at their backs, they have put up with the inconveniences of an alliance for a long time.

In Asia there is perplexity. Japan, another nation with the Soviets at its back, and conscious of its dependence on sea traffic, has managed to find an accommodation. The Asian nations all well understand the ANZUS role in maintaining the sea lines of communications (SLOCs). Singapore has expressed ASEAN's sentiments at the unravelling of ANZUS. Indonesians, bound to praise "national resilience," admit to a feeling that "having ANZUS down there" was comfortable. In the Pacific only Vanuatu refuses nuclear ships. Some of the smaller islands might be ambivalent—but geography makes it unlikely that they would be put to the test. Most of the Pacific island nations, following the lead of Fiji, have said that they like to feel that ANZUS is supporting them, because they know that neither economically nor militarily can they do much on their own.

Australia values ANZUS, despite the cantankerous outbursts from the far left and the threats of

sustained pressure from those who, like Peter Garrett, hailed the refusal to allow support for MX testing as a "victory for the anti-nuclear party." The ALP's campaign to clarify why the joint facilities are helpful in nuclear issues, should do much to diffuse the hostilities that have been aroused in some circles against US cooperation at North-West Cape, Pine Gap, and Nurrungar. Prime Minister Hawke has said that relations with the United States are stronger than at any time since World War II. Senior US officials have concurred. Neither Australia nor the United States wants ANZUS as a trilateral relationship to end; for the time being they will leave an empty chair, and carry on. The Australians have been at pains to pour oil on the troubled waters and have been steadfast in their efforts at quiet diplomacy. Australia, besides having economic ties with New Zealand, and shared responsibilities in the Pacific, had expected closer defense links. New Zealand has backed out of the proposed joint submarine project. In Australia, attention will now focus on the budget. If Mr. Hawke shows firmness and his policies prevail, he will recoup some of the support lost over the MX retreat, and the left's forces will not be dominant.

If the three signatories of ANZUS all wish the alliance to continue, something would be gained by each country defining exactly what is important to them in the relationship. This is not likely to bring about a solution. Mr. Lange has domestic political problems and is not able to follow Australia in embracing a complementary policy of peace and disarmament coupled with support of a nuclear deterrent. Unfortunately, when once an alliance is

broken, not only the posture of the signatories changes, but the perception of other nations changes and it is hard to return to the status quo ante.

The US view is well summarized in the words of Mr. Paul D. Wolfowitz, then Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East and Pacific, speaking at the National Defense University's Pacific Symposium in February 1985:

> Our regional alliances are important in preventing small conflicts from even starting; and since it is from small conflicts that the greatest danger of big ones arise, these alliances are important for preserving nuclear peace. The mutual commitments that these alliances entail help to avoid the kind of isolationism that brought on the last world war. For these reasons, ironically, the effect of New Zealand's action, small though it may be, is exactly opposite to its announced purpose of reducing the risk of nuclear war.... With words, New Zealand assures us that it remains committed to ANZUS. But by its deeds, New Zealand has effectively curtailed its operational role in the alliance. A military alliance has little meaning without military co-operation. New Zealand can't have it both ways.

Americans, who have lived with the consciousness of the dangers of nuclear war for a long time, have difficulty in realizing that for New Zealanders the horrors of a possible nuclear holocaust outweigh all other historical or strategic perceptions. After seven months of consultations and a number of encouraging signals from the New Zealand Prime

Minister, Americans are puzzled that Mr. Lange not only withdrew from allied cooperation but accused the United States of hoping to bring in another government.

The US government has made its point—that it does not acquiesce in alliance bad faith; now it must show the world that it has patience and flexibility. Because the future response to emergencies will suffer from the interruption of planning, consultation, and exercising with New Zealand, the United States must take steps that will prevent a degradation of the surveillance of the SLOCs. A stable security community in place in the Pacific is the best card to bring to the negotiating table to call a halt in the arms race and to achieve a step in the direction so devoutly desired by the anti-nuclear activists.

Endnotes

1. Statement, Canberra, 25 January 1985. See also *Hansard,* Representatives, 25 February 1985. (*Editor's Note: Hansard* is the record of parliamentary proceedings in Australia.)

2. Interview, Los Angeles, 27 February 1985.

3. Statement, Canberra, 10 February 1985.

4. Deputy Prime Minister's press interview, Wellington, 5 March 1985.

5. John Henderson, Keith Jackson, Richard Kennaway, eds. *Beyond New Zealand; The Foreign Policy of a Small State.* (Auckland: Methuen, 1980), pp. 52–56.

6. *Melbourne Herald,* 1 March 1985.

7. 1975 New Zealand Labour Party *Manifesto,* p. 28.

8. See Assistant Deputy Secretary for Defense James A. Kelly's testimony before hearing of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Chairman, Rep. Stephen J. Solarz, 18 March 1985. 99th Cong., 1st Sess.

9. Introduction to *Alternatives to ANZUS . . . A Paper for Discussion.* (Wellington, Peace and Justice Forum of the Wellington Labour Regional Council, 1983).

10. *Early Achievements of the Fourth Labour Government, July 1984–85* (Wellington: Prepared by the Parliamentary Labour Party Research Unit, 1 April 1985).

11. *Canberra Times*, 22 March 1985.

12. *The Environmental Consequences to New Zealand of Nuclear Warfare in the Northern Hemisphere* (Wellington: New Zealand Ecological Society, 1984).

13. Lange, Interview on TV program "Sunday," 29 July 1984.

14. Hayden, *Hansard*, Representatives, 27 February 1985.

15. Hawke, *Hansard*, Representatives, 27 February 1985.

16. The text of the complete debates is found in *Hansard*, Senate and Representatives, 27 February 1985. Other relevant material is in *Hansard* 22 and 25 February 1985.

17. Senator Evans had inserted in *Hansard* the results of the review of ANZUS undertaken by the Labor party on coming to power in 1983. Senator Evans emphasized that he saw Australia's commitment to the larger Western alliance and treaty arrangements as the best way to secure ultimate nuclear disarmament. Two days earlier, he had been asked about a motion put forward by the Australian Capital Territory (that is, Canberra) branch of the Australian Labor party which stated that the alliance presents contradictions with Labor policy. The motion had been seconded by Senator Ryan, the Minister of Education. Senator Evans said that it had been a matter of internal discussion at a party forum and in no way changed the party's position.

Australian parliamentary debates are conducted with

a good deal of spirit. The "MX" debate was very useful because it gave the government a chance to make its posture regarding ANZUS very clear. The government also had the opportunity to point out that the only time that any ban had been placed upon any element of the US defense force entering the country was during the (Liberal) government of William McMahon in 1971 when it banned nuclear-powered warships. This must have afforded the ALP some satisfaction since Mr. Ian Sinclair, the Leader of the National Party, the other half of the coalition, had reminded the house that in 1976 Mr. Hawke had signed an advertisement calling for the end of the ANZUS.

18. *The Australian,* 7 March 1985.

19. Quoted by B. A. Santamaria in his *Comment,* Sydney, 12 March 1985.

20. *Australia and the Nuclear Choice.* The Independent Committee of Enquiry into Nuclear Weapons and Other Consequences of Australian Uranium Mining (Sydney: Total Environment Centre, 1984).

21. Testimony at hearing 18 March 1985, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. Henry S. Albinski, Director Australian Studies Center, Pennsylvania State University.

Appendix A

The ANZUS Treaty

TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING SECURITY

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have

military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defence for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations

of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VII

The parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

Article VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the desposit of such notice.

Article XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.

For Australia:

PERCY C. SPENDER

For New Zealand:

C.A. BERENDSEN

For the United States of America:

DEAN ACHESON
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
ALEXANDER WILEY
JOHN J. SPARKMAN

Appendix B

Heylen Polls on Nuclear and Defense Issues

Labour government policy to ban nuclear-powered vessels from New Zealand ports	**4th August 1984**	**9th February 1985**	**23rd March 1985**
	%	%	%
Approve	45.4	52.3	51.8
Disapprove	45.9	37.2	40.9
Neither/don't know	8.7	10.5	7.3
	100.0	100.0	100.0
Labour government policy to ban the entry of nuclear weapons into New Zealand			
	%	%	%
Approve	76.4	73.4	76.6
Disapprove	18.4	18.5	18.6
Don't know	5.2	8.1	4.8
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Notes: Only the first two questions had been measured previously. Maximum sampling error estimated to be ±3.1% at the 95% confidence level.

Source: Heylen Poll: Nuclear and Defence Issues, 23 March 1985. Prepared for Eye Witness News, Television New Zealand.

Would prefer ...	23rd March 1985 %
Breaking defence ties with US	44.8
Allowing ships that could be nuclear-armed into NZ ports	45.3
Don't know	9.9
	100.0

Attitudes to nuclear and defence issues	Agree %	Disagree %	Neither/ don't know %
NZ has been treated *fairly* by US officials following the NZ ban on nuclear ships	38.0	53.0	9.0
If NZ was attacked tomorrow, the US would still come to our aid	68.5	17.0	14.5
NZ has neglected her share of responsibilities under the ANZUS agreement	31.3	53.4	15.3
Having defence ties with the US *increases* the risk of attack on NZ	30.4	62.0	7.6
NZ should expand its own armed forces and defence systems	44.6	47.5	7.9
NZ is *unlikely* to ever be attacked	38.1	47.1	14.8

Attitudes to nuclear and defence issues	Agree %	Disagree %	Neither/ don't know %
In a nuclear war between the major powers, most people living in NZ would survive	15.6	65.9	18.5
It is likely that there will be a major nuclear war within the next 15 years	23.4	53.8	22.8

Demographic and Party Support Differences

		Sex		Age			
	Total Sample	Male	Female	15–24 years	25–39 years	40–54 years	55 years & Over
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Govt. policy to ban nuclear-powered vessels from NZ ports:							
Approve	51.8	48.5	55.1	62.4	54.6	47.4	42.1
Disapprove	40.8	45.8	36.2	28.6	37.9	45.9	52.0
Govt. policy to ban entry of nuclear weapons into NZ:							
Approve	76.6	73.2	79.9	82.0	77.0	78.0	69.8
Disapprove	18.6	22.9	14.5	11.8	18.9	17.9	25.4

Demographic and Party Support Differences (continued)

	Total sample %	Party currently support: Labour %	National %	NZ party %	Social Credit %	Other/ none/ don't know %
Govt. policy to ban nuclear powered vessels from NZ ports:						
Approve	51.8	75.4	18.2	47.9	58.5	46.8
Disapprove	40.8	18.1	75.1	46.9	41.5	41.2
Govt. policy to ban entry of nuclear weapons into NZ:						
Approve	76.6	92.2	54.5	78.1	71.7	73.5
Disapprove	18.6	5.5	40.2	19.8	26.4	15.3

Appendix C

The Government of New Zealand's Position on Ship Visits

The speech of the US Ambassador to New Zealand of 5 March 1985 was carried in the magazine *New Zealand Listener*. Mr. Lange's corresponding statement appeared in the 13 April issue of the magazine and gives the government of New Zealand's views of the US and New Zealand positions regarding ship visits.

> In the face of the New Zealand Government's determination to persist in its intention to exclude nuclear weapons, the US made a request for a port visit by a vessel which appeared to comply with New Zealand's policy. The difficulty for the New Zealand Government was that the Americans could not allow themselves to be seen to be complying with New Zealand's policy. The American defence posture requires the presentation of their vessels as at any time capable of defensive action

with nuclear weapons, whether or not any given vessel is at any given time nuclear armed. Whatever vessel came to New Zealand, that vessel could not, in terms of that posture, be allowed to be identified as unarmed with nuclear weapons. It was for that reason that the US had previously made plain its reservations about any proposal to legislate to exclude nuclear weapons from New Zealand waters. Any such action was incompatible with the American wish to protect the untrammelled movement of its nuclear capacity.

American reluctance to send a vessel to New Zealand which would not only be unarmed with nuclear weapons but which would be seen to be unarmed with nuclear weapons forced the New Zealand Government's hand. To accept a vessel which was the subject of American assertions as to its nuclear readiness would effectively defeat the New Zealand policy, whether or not any given vessel was nuclear armed. The only tenable position left to the New Zealand Government was to accept a vessel which it could establish from its own resources was not nuclear armed. An examination was made which could establish no more than the broad probability that a particular vessel was not nuclear armed. The possibility that nuclear weapons were present could not be conclusively eliminated, and for that reason the New Zealand Government declined the application for a port visit.

The disappointment which was felt by both sides at this point in the proceedings was understandable. The US reaction was stern. It

has severely curtailed its defence and intelligence co-operation with New Zealand. While the ANZUS alliance remains formally in place, considerable questions have been raised about the structure and future direction of the New Zealand military and intelligence effort, not to mention the conduct of our international relations.

The political problems posed by the American action are acute. The National party, which has pledged to return New Zealand to "full and active membership of the ANZUS alliance," cannot do so without at the least being seen as admitting nuclear weapons to New Zealand. Such an action would satisfy some elements of opinion in New Zealand but it could not restore any kind of consensus about the ANZUS alliance. The Labour Government must accommodate the deep-seated feelings of insecurity which have been awakened by the attenuation.

Of the defence relationship with the US:

The possibility of consensus about New Zealand's defence arrangements lies in the development of a credible defence posture in the context of effective military relationships with the conventional forces of other powers. There is scope for that development within the framework of the ANZUS alliance, if the US will accede to it; failing that, there is scope in the relationships New Zealand maintains with the armed forces of other nations, Australia not least.

It is clear that the building of a consensus about New Zealand's defence and security

terests will not be rapidly achieved. The element of partisanship will not be easily eliminated and will continue to obscure our common interest. It is in that interest that a careful and serious examination and assessment of New Zealand policy in defence and international relations should be made.

Appendix D

US Congressional Hearing, March 1985

OPENING STATEMENT BY STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 18 MARCH 1985

Since the end of WW II and the coming into force of the ANZUS alliance, the South Pacific has been an area of exemplary peace and progress. The test of any security arrangement is to deter a prospective enemy from aggressive excursions. Accordingly ANZUS belongs with NATO and the US-Japan Treaty on the list of successful international peace keeping arrangements.

ANZUS has enjoyed strong bipartisan support in the United States right from the start when it was signed for us by four distinguished statesmen—Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Alexander Wiley and John Sparkman. An important component of this unwavering US commitment to ANZUS has been the manifest resolve of our Treaty Partners. For generations, Australian, New Zealand and American service men and women have served gallantly side by side defending freedom the

world over, and continue their efforts today in a wide variety of places and functions. All Americans take great pride in the intimate and cooperative relations that we have with Australia and New Zealand, our sister democracies in the South Pacific.

Faced with growing Soviet military power, thus far not materially constricted by the arms control efforts of the West, the United States and its allies share the burden and benefits of a worldwide system of security arrangements dedicated and successfully managed to deter Soviet aggression. NATO, the US-Japan Security Treaty, and ANZUS constitute an interlocking global defense against the Soviet Union.

Each component nation of this worldwide peacekeeping structure happily is free to decide how in accord with its political processes it will fulfill its treaty obligations. Accordingly, it is with full respect for New Zealand's democratic system that we today address the decision that the government of New Zealand has made—in effect to ban 80 percent of the US navy from its ports.

This hearing also provides us with an opportunity to review the basis for ANZUS, as originally constituted in 1952, and its rationale for today. The United States has entered into many defense commitments over the years and too seldom reviews them to determine their appropriateness to contemporary circumstances.

What should be the American reaction to this ending of coopeation in an important area by a tried and true ally? How significant in military and political terms is New Zealand's action to the security interests of the US and its allies? Should the US do anything in an open and honorable way to try and persuade the Government and people of New Zealand to reconsider their position?

RESOLUTION BY THE US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

Section 1. Obligations Under the ANZUS Treaty.

It is the sense of the Congress that so long as New Zealand is not fulfilling all its responsibilities under the Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America—

(1) the United States should consult with the other parties to that Treaty, the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, with a view toward convincing the Government of New Zealand to change its present policy regarding visits by United States naval vessels; and

(2) if a successful resolution of this issue is not achieved, the United States should then consult with the Government of Australia about formally terminating that Treaty, while continuing to fully maintain, on a bilateral basis, security relations between the United States and Australia in accordance with the terms of that Treaty.

Section 2. Maintaining Friendly Political and Economic Relations.

It is further the sense of the Congress that the United States should maintain the sort of friendly political and economic ties with New Zealand which the United States maintains with many countries which share our democratic commitments and values and with which the United States may not have cooperative security relationships.

Appendix E

The Australian Labor Party's Platform on Disarmament

6. DISARMAMENT

The threat of nuclear war is a threat to the existence of humanity. If it should occur, no country will escape the devastating consequences, the full extent of which are incalculable, but are likely to go beyond the immediate effects of nuclear explosions to include a climatic catastrophe of monstrous proportions.

The struggle against this threat should not be left just to the superpowers and the other nuclear weapons states. Since all nations would suffer from their folly, all nations have the right to be involved in seeking to avert the danger.

Source: Australian Labor Party Platform Constitution and Rules as Approved by the 36th National Conference, Canberra 1984. Published by R. F. McMullan, National Secretary, Australian Labor Party (Burton, Australian Capital Territory, 1984).

The upsurge of anger and frustrations among ordinary people throughout the world against the nuclear madness is justified. Only if ordinary people demonstrate consistently their insistence that this madness be stopped will the world's leaders move to take action to bring it to a halt.

For the Australian Labor Government, there can be no higher priority than nuclear arms control and disarmament. If we fail in this, we fail in everything.

General and complete disarmament is the only way to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. This was recognised in the Report of the Palme Commission and is a view supported by the Labor Government.

As the Palme Commission also recognises, total nuclear disarmament will not come either quickly or by unilateral action, but only by negotiation and agreement. It is therefore imperative that while the Government pursues vigorously the goal of total nuclear disarmament, it should also support in the interim the most stable nuclear balance attainable. The Government should oppose all technological developments and strategic nuclear doctrines which destabilise that balance. For this reason, the Government rejects doctrines of nuclear war—fighting and limited nuclear war: nuclear war cannot be limited and cannot be won.

Labor supports a mutual and verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons testing, production and development as a means of breaking the upward spiral of the arms race.

A freeze on nuclear weapons should be only the first step. It must be followed by negotiations which aim for deep cuts in the high stock piles of nuclear weapons. The immediate goal must be the most stable possible balance at the lowest possible level of nuclear weapons;

the ultimate goal must remain their complete elimination.

The Australian Labor government will seek to develop regional initiatives to pursue the cause of nuclear disarmament including regional conferences and other initiatives in support of the creation of nuclear free zones in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and South East Asia.

Finally Labor recognises the importance of the active involvement of all sections of the labour movement in discussions and serious dialogue with the peace movement and action to promote understanding and create a positive climate for nuclear disarmament and support for positive new government initiatives towards this most crucial goal.

The Author

Dora Alves was born in England and educated at St. Anne's College, Oxford University. She holds graduate degrees from American University and the Catholic University of America. As a naval analyst she has specialized for some years in Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific area. Dr. Alves has travelled and lectured in Australia and the Pacific region. She is the author of numerous articles and of the definitive *The ANZUS Partners* (Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1984).

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